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The quest for political support drives to upward deviations from forecasted public deficits 
when i) budget procedures are soft, ii) breaking promises involving higher expenditures and 
lower taxes is costly in political terms, and iii) ex–post control by voters and political 
opposition is imperfect. This hypothesis is tested using data from Spanish municipalities 
during the period 1985-1995. Econometric estimates show that single-party majority 
incumbents are less prone to change forecasted budgets. While their forecasted deficits tend 
to be higher, they have lower actual deficits, which may be interpreted as the consequence 
of a higher consistency in the budgetary process. Secondly, upward deviations in deficit 
tend to rise in election years. While forecasted deficits are not different in election years, 
actual deficits are. Moreover, elections cause systematic downward deviations in revenues. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Empirical research on the determinants of public deficits uses to take actual and not 
initial or forecasted figures as endogenous variable. This choice is usually justified in 
practical reasons: deviations from initial deficits vary in both cross-section and time-series 
dimensions, distorting econometric estimates. Deviations are then merely perceived as a 
noise. But this strategy hides some striking questions. What explains deviations? Why large 
upward deviations are observed in certain cases but not in others? Moreover, the influence 
on actual deficits of some political factors as the electoral cycle, political fragmentation, 
and ideology may be better understood treating deviations in deficits as a separate 
endogenous variable. As it will be shown, interactions among political promises made by 
the incumbent, reputation, budget procedures
3, and political control significantly help to 
understand the political economy of public deficits. 
 
Relationships to be tested in this paper are based on three main arguments. Firstly, 
adhering to both promises and forecasted budgets is an investment in reputation for 
governments, whose benefits depend on the degree of ex post control made by voters and 
political opposition. Conversely, breakings will be costly in the future. Therefore, the 
higher the control, the higher the incentive for governments to adhere to both promises and 
forecasted figures. This relationship is rooted in accountability models proposed by 
Przeworski et al (1999). Secondly, a forecasted budget showing a big deficit is politically 
costly, because it may be interpreted as a signal of fiscal imprudence and the seed of future 
fiscal adjustments
4. Hence consistency of forecasted deficits and promises involving higher 
spending or lower taxes will tend to be lower when the latter are more generous, which 
boosts future deviations in the former. Of course, underestimating forecasted deficit does 
                                                           
3 As Alesina and Perotti (1999) state, both concepts of “budgetary institutions” and “budget procedures” refer 
to rules and regulations affecting the elaboration, approval and implementation of budgets. In this paper, 
attention is concentrated into the last phase, insofar as we are interested in explaining deviations from initially 
approved budgets. 
4 According to the empirical evidence presented by Alesina et al (1998), fiscal adjustments do not seem to 
involve cabinet turnover or negative judges in polls. One possible explanation for this result would be the 
following. Current incumbent is not considered responsible for current levels of deficit and debt, but it is 
viewed as the result of past governments’ politics or exogenous shocks. Adjustment is itself presented by the 
incumbent and interpreted by voters as an unpleasant but necessary fiscal promise. Then adhering to fiscal 
consolidation will not lead to political costs.   2
not stop the growth of debt, but just postpones fiscal consolidation to future budgets. 
However, it can be enough to confuse voters regarding the actual state of public finance and 
the responsibility for future adjustments (Milesi-Ferreti, 1997; Reviglio, 2001). Thirdly, 
generosity in promises is positively correlated to the need of political support. Coalitions or 
sporadic backings to minority cabinets involve bargaining and concessions in order to 
persuade involved political forces. Moreover, promises will also be more generous just 
before elections to increase incumbent’s popularity among voters. 
 
In sum, if i) deviations from initial deficits are possible, ii) breaking promises is 
costly, and iii) ex post control by voters and political opposition is imperfect, a positive 
relationship between the quest for political support and upward deviations from forecasted 
deficits will be found.  
 
Interactions among these mechanisms are tested using data from Spanish 
municipalities over the period 1985-1995. Several reasons justify our choice. Firstly, 
Spanish municipalities enjoyed a high freedom to get into debt. Secondly, budget 
procedures were soft, and significant deviations from initial budgets were possible from a 
legal standpoint. Thirdly, available empirical studies reveal that ex post control on budgets 
is also soft. 
 
The paper is organized in five sections, this one included. Section two briefly 
reviews research on budget deficits and the relevant empirical evidence on this topic. 
Empirical analysis is developed in the next two sections. In section three, the choice of 
sample is justified and variables and data are presented. Econometric estimates are 
discussed in section four. Section five concludes. 
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II. THEORETICAL ARGUMENTS 
 
Promises of boosting spending programs, cutting tax rates and rising tax deductions 
increase popularity and political support to incumbents, provided that voters and other 
political parties are not simultaneously informed about the way of financing them. In such a 
case, looking at forecasted budgets is the only way to know if promises are consistent from 
a financial standpoint. In particular, big forecasted deficits may involve distrust on the 
capacity of the incumbent to manage public affairs and expectations of unpopular future 
fiscal adjustments. Therefore, governments may be tempted to make many popular “fiscal 
promises” while hiding financial difficulties of achieving them
5. 
 
Obviously, voters and political parties are not interested in just listening to promises 
and regarding forecasted budgets. Implementation of the former and execution of the latter 
are relevant for reputation of governments. In this sense, several questions must be taken 
into account in order to understand the step from promises and forecasted deficits to 
performance and actual deficits. 
 
Firstly, elections in democracies do not only serve to hold governments responsible 
for the results of their past actions (Fiorina, 1981; Kramer, 1971), but also to select policies 
or policy-bearing politicians. As Manin, Przeworski and Stokes (1999) explain, if 
incumbents anticipate that voters will not only pay attention to their past policies, but also 
to their new promises, they must be concerned about being believed. Adhering to promises 
would then be an investment in reputation. 
 
Secondly, while hard budget procedures in the implementation phase drive to 
inconsistency between promises and budget figures to just affect the meeting of the former, 
soft budget procedures in the implementation phase will likely drive to a mixed solution of 
deviations in deficit and failures to keep promises.  
                                                           
5 Milesi-Ferreti (1997) makes a similar argument. When talking about promises in general, literature refers to 
benefits but also to costs of meeting them (Ferejohn, 1986). For instance, constructing a highway promised to 
drivers may involve political costs if its ecological impact mobilize ecologist groups. The case of fiscal 
promises seems simpler. The cost of adhering one fiscal promise may be better proxied by its impact on the 
budget.   4
Thirdly, the probability of deviations from promises and initial deficit falls when the 
degree of ex post control made by voters and political opposition rises. In particular, a 
deficient control would incentive inflated previsions of revenues, by exaggerating the 
growth of tax bases or the efficiency of tax administration, and underestimated 
expenditures. In other words, incumbents would not incur in avoidable political costs when 
discussing and passing initial budgets if barely controlled departures from them are possible 
(González-Páramo, 2001).  
 
Last but not least, politicians may provide excuses or justifications when they 
deviate from their promises and budget forecasts (McGraw, 1990). Exogenous and 
unforeseen contingencies can be claimed to justify that incumbents could not adhere to 
them. Among these mitigating circumstances are often included the politics of a previous 
administration, economic shocks or vetos by other political forces (Barreiro, 1999; Alesina 
and Perotti, 1999). 
 
In sum, politicians face a strategic dilemma: a lower level of promises and a higher 
performance or a higher level of promises and a lower performance. The first strategy 
involves more popularity and political support ex ante, but also the risk of a worse 
reputation ex post, provided that excuses were not completely convincingly. The second 
one is less popular ex ante but yields a better reputation ex post. Focusing on deviations 
from initial deficits, what could explain differences among governments and across time? 
Six mechanisms are suggested: 
 
1.  Forecasted deficits result from predictions of both revenues and expenditures. 
According to Feenberg et al (1989), an efficient use of available information when 
predictions are made should drive, at least, to correct answers on average
6. Of course, 
predictions may be deliberately over- or underestimated. In fact, this is the hypothesis 
to be tested in this paper. But deviations may be also motivated by involuntarily errors 
                                                           
6 While Feenberg et al (1989) refers just to revenues, their reasoning may be generalized to both sides of 
budgets. They make a distinction between “strong rationality” and “weak rationality” in forecasts. In the first 
case, predictions rightly incorporate all relevant information available at the time they are made. In the 
second, information is not fully utilized, but an efficient forecaster would get the correct answer on average.    5
in predictions. With a null expected value (there would be both positive and negative 
errors), the standard deviation of errors in predictions may depend on factors such as 
technical capacities of officials. The higher the technical capacity the lower the standard 
deviation of errors. Assuming that technical capacity and jurisdiction size are positively 
correlated, variability in prediction errors will be negative correlated with the latter. 
 
2.  Flexibility during execution of the budget is a key factor. The higher the flexibility (no 
cash limits, possibility of transfers between chapters and changes in budget law during 
execution, carryover of unused funds to the next year) the lower the probability of 
deviation
7. In this sense, there is a number of papers showing a negative relationship 
between the flexibility in budget execution and the size of actual deficits in European 
countries (Von Hagen and Harden, 1994; De Haan et al, 1999; Hallerberg and Von 
Hagen, 1999; González-Páramo, 2001). Moreover, using data from United States, the 
most effective limitation to deficit arises in those states with budget rules requiring an 
ex post balancing with no carry-forward provisions. Balanced-budget rules applied on 
ex ante figures are therefore clearly less stringent due to the possibility of deviations 
(Inman, 1996; Boothe and Reid, 1998). 
 
3.  Thirdly, fragmentation of the political process may affect policy outcomes. The more 
players cooperating, the more the logrolling agreements, since individual parties will 
each veto spending cuts or tax increases that would impinge on their constituencies. 
And this would be so for both coalition cabinets and minority cabinets. Bargaining 
would be within cabinets in the first case, and with parliament in the second one. 
Empirical evidence about the effects of fragmentation on deficit is not conclusive. In a 
seminal paper, Roubini and Sachs (1989) defined an index of power dispersion with 
four categories and progressively higher scores: one-party majority incumbent, small 
coalition, large coalition, and minority government. With national data from OECD 
countries, they found that the variable was significant in deficit regressions, showing 
that fragmentation was positively correlated with deficit. While this result was 
                                                           
7 Procedures directly aimed at bypass fiscal constraints by reducing recorded expenditures or increasing 
receipts artificially are set aside in what follows. Reviglio (2001) analyzes this kind of strategies in the Italian 
case.   6
confirmed by Grilli et al (1991), Edin and Ohlsson (1991) found that the correlation 
was basically due to minority governments and not coalitions. Moreover, De Haan and 
Sturm (1994) rejected that minority governments involve higher deficits. Since then, 
several papers have tried to define and utilize different measures of political 
fragmentation with no conclusive results. For instance, while Volkerink and De Haan 
(2000) showed that the number of parties in the cabinet is correlated positively with 
higher deficits, Feld and Kirchgässner (1999) found no correlation for a sample of 
Swiss municipalities and using public debt per taxpayer as explained variable. And it 
was the same in the case of Kontopoulos and Perotti (1999), using data on deficits from 
OECD countries. On the contrary, they found that “executive fragmentation”, proxied 
by the number of spending ministers, is highly significant. Things become more 
complex if elements of direct democracy come into play, as shown by Feld and 
Kischgässner (1999). In those jurisdictions where voters participate in the budgetary 
process by means of referenda on budget deficits, the level of debt tends to be lower. 
According to authors, it is a consequence of a reduction in the problem of a “fiscal 
commons”
8, and it shows that voters care more about fiscal discipline than politicians. 
What should be then the expected effect of political fragmentation on deviations in 
initial deficit? With respect to one-party majority cabinets, both minority cabinets and 
the main party in coalition cabinets must make more promises as the price to pay for 
temporary or permanent backings. Therefore, promises and forecasted deficit would be 
more consistent in the case of the former, which involves lower budgetary deviations. 
Direct democracy would influence on deviations only if it involves more consistency 
between promises and forecasted deficits. 
 
4.  According to the literature on political business cycles, incumbents may have incentives 
to behave differently in election years. As remarked by Blais and Nadeau (1992), 
political-induced cycles are consistent with rational forward-looking behavior under 
different provisos: asymmetric information between voters and the incumbent, rational 
ignorance among voters or uncertainty over the outcome of a ballot. Moreover, Baleiras 
                                                           
8 “The problem of a fiscal commons consists in the fact that each of the n agents uses the whole stock of 
resources and not one-nth of it as a basis for consumption or spending decisions” (Feld and Kirchgässner, 
1999).   7
and Da Silva (2003) show that political business cycles may be explained using an 
equilibrium perfect-foresight model, which totally dispenses with any form of 
irrationality on the part of voters, but is focused on the incumbent’s concern with her 
own welfare in cases of victory and defeat. Seminal paper by Nordhaus (1975) on 
political business cycle and most of empirical works with national data concentrate in 
government actions to manipulate macroeconomic outcomes such as unemployment, 
inflation, and economic growth (Frey, 1997). On the contrary, Blais and Nadeu (1992) 
focused on electoral cycles in government budgets. They argue that it is easier to 
manipulate budgets than macroeconomic performance. In our paper attention is paid to 
deviations from forecasted figures due to electoral cycles. The hypothesis to be tested is 
that promises and forecasted deficit would be more consistent in non-election years, 
which involves lower upward deviations in deficits.  
 
5.  Ideology could also make a difference for deviations in forecasted deficits. While there 
exists a number of empirical works showing that left wing cabinets are more prone to 
high spending and taxes, evidence on the relationship between ideology and the size of 
actual deficit is not conclusive (Hahm et al, 1995; Tavares, 2004; Castells et al, 2004). 
However, Mulas (2003) finds that left wing incumbents are more reluctant to cut public 
investment and employment, which may be relevant for the aim of this paper. If 
changing tax legislation during the fiscal year were difficult, an unforeseen expansive 
shock on one expenditure function would have asymmetric effects on deficit deviations. 
For left wing cabinets, the shock would be translated less into expenditure cuts in other 
functions and more into an upward deviation in deficit. Deviation to be compensated in 
next budget years if uncorrelation between ideology and deficit size wants to be held. 
On the other hand, voters might judge right wing and left wing governments differently. 
According to empirical evidence provided by Lowry et al (1998: 759): “Republican 
gubernatorial candidates lose votes if their party is responsible for unanticipated 
increases in the size of the state budget; Democrats do not and indeed they may be 
rewarded for small increases”. 
   8
6.  Budget deviations should be negatively correlated with the degree of ex post political 
control on incumbent’s performance. In this sense, several factors should be taken into 
account. The role played by the political opposition denouncing the break of promises 
and budget deviations is obviously important. And this task will be favored by 
budgetary rules requiring detailed parliamentary control on deviations and actual 
budgets. Jurisdiction sizes could also be relevant for political control. Although 
classical literature on fiscal federalism traces a positive relationship between 
decentralization and accountability, Boadway (2000) points out that empirical evidence 
does not clearly show that lower levels of government were more accountable to their 
electorates
9. Moreover, and given that the glare of media publicity is more often 
directed at bigger jurisdictions, the opposite could be argued. Therefore the sign of this 
relationship is undetermined. 
 
 
III. SAMPLE AND DATA 
 
  De Haan et al (1999) show a number of indicators on budgetary institutions for all 
UE-12 countries at the beginning of the 1990s. Some of them are reproduced in table 1
10. 
Spain was the European country with the lowest total score (Atot), which means the softest 
budgetary institutions, and one of the lowest regarding flexibility in execution of budget 
(A4). Moreover, the autonomy of Spanish subcentral governments in terms of planning and 
balanced-budget requirements (A5) is one of the highest. The sum of A5 and A6 drives 
Spain to the last place. 
 
                                                           
9 This statement might change when the possibility of referenda on fiscal affairs is taking into account. If 
referenda increase the accountability of policy decisions, as suggested by Feld and Kirchsgassner (1999), and 
referenda are easier to implement in small jurisdictions, correlation between size and accountability would be 
actually negative.  
10 Items are defined in the following way. A5 refers to presence of cash limits, transfers between chapters, 
changes in budget law during execution, and carryover of unused funds to the next year. A6 is the score on 
two items: whether subcentral governments face some kind of balanced-budget requirement, and the degree of 
planning autonomy of subcentral authorities. The higher the autonomy the lower the score in A6. Atot is the 
sum of variables A1 to A6, where A1 to A4 refers to other aspects of the budgetary process (position of 
minister of finance, transparency of the budget, and so on).   9
The real use of potential flexibility by Spanish governments has been highly 
significant. The case study carried on by Barea (1998) on expenditures made by the central 
government during the period 1983-1995 reveals significant deviations from initial budgets. 
According to estimates by González-Páramo (2001), departures from forecasted 
expenditures were on average +12.3% (1985-1989), +8.5% (1990-1995), and +6.4% (1996-
2000)
11. Regional and local governments were subject to similar budgetary rules and 
deviations were also significant (Valiño, 1999; De Pablos and Valiño, 2000). 
 
Table 1: Aspects of Budgetary Institutions at the Beginning of the 1990s 
Indicator A5  A6  A5+A6  Atot 
Belgium 1.80  1.33  3.13  7.18 
Denmark 2.60  2.67  5.27  15.08 
France 3.13  3.33  6.46  20.23 
Germany 2.82  2.00  4.82  15.26 
Greece   2.90  2.67  5.57  9.88 
Ireland 3.00  0.00  3.00  8.35 
Italy 0.25  1.33  1.58  7.03 
Luxemburg 2.67  0.67  3.34 13.06 
Netherlands 0.33  2.00  2.33  14.38 
Portugal 2.67  0.00  2.67  8.38 
Spain 1.53  0.00  1.53  6.33 
United Kingdom  2.93  2.66  5.59  17.24 
Source: De Haan et al (1999) 
 
 
Both forecasted and actual deficits were possible for local governments during the 
eighties and nineties in Spain
12. With no access to issue money, the instrument to finance 
unbalances is borrowing. As pointed out by Monasterio and Suárez-Pandiello (2002), 
limiting indebtedness involves then limiting the size of the possible deficit
13. Besides, the 
strategy of keeping spending and deficit off budget has been also implemented as in the rest 
of fiscal tiers. As a consequence, off-budgeting debt of local governments has grown 
steadily. From 2.9% of total in 1985, to 9.0% in 1995, and 9.4% in 1998 (Monasterio and 
Suárez-Pandiello, 2002).  
                                                           
11 In terms of Spanish GDP: 2.5%, 1.9%, and 1.4%, respectively. 
12 Things have significantly change since 2002, with a much more stringent regulation on public deficit, 
affecting to all fiscal tiers. See González-Páramo (2001).  
13 Monasterio and Suárez-Pandiello (2002) and Vallés et al (2003) analyze regulation of local borrowing in 
Spain.   10
Regarding to the ex post control on local budgets, both forecasted and actual 
budgets must be discussed and passed by the council, and voters may directly express 
reservations through legal channels. With some exceptions established by law, deviations 
on initial budgets during the budget year should also be previously passed by the council. 
Additionally, actual budgets must be sent to the Spanish public audit office (“Tribunal de 
Cuentas”) after passed by the council
14. However, some clues show that the ex post control 
of budgets is clearly imperfect.  
 
According to the analysis by De Pablos and Valiño (2000) over the period 1986-
1992, Spanish local governments made extensive use of gimmicks to escape from controls 
on budget modifications carried on during budget year. Secondly, around 25% of 
municipalities on average did not sent actual budgets to be audited. Thirdly, there were lags 
of several years (more than five, sometimes) between the end of a budget year and the 
publication of corresponding public audit reports. Fourthly, failures to comply with 
legislation are significantly higher in small municipalities (under 5000 inhabitants), 
seemingly because of deficient human and material resources. Lastly, those characteristics 
apply for municipalities in all Spanish regions. 
 
  In sum, Spanish municipalities met the conditions identified in the introduction and 
therefore they are suitable to test relationships pointed out in section two.  
 
The sample used in econometric estimates corresponds to all Galician municipalities 
observed from 1985 to 1995. While heterogeneity concerning budget procedures or control 
practices is clearly reduced when attention is paid to just one country, using information 
from just one region should be justified. Firstly, available information at the local level is 
not homogeneous between regions. Difficulties to build a wide and accurate database 
significantly increase when municipalities from several regions want to be taken into 
account. Secondly, homogeneity between municipalities in terms of legal requirements on 
                                                           
14 In some Spanish regions, local governments must send actual budgets to corresponding regional 
government and regional audit office. In all cases, fiscal year starts on 1 January.   11
actual budgets is guaranteed
15. Panel data is unbalanced due to the lack of information on 
both initial and actual budgets in a number of cases (Table 2). Data Source is the Galician 
regional government (Xunta de Galicia). Variables used in empirical work are defined in 
table 3. All endogenous variables are weighted by forecasted non-financial expenditures 
and expressed in percentage. Using non-financial forecasted revenues instead of 
expenditures did not change econometric results. Finally, table 4 synthesizes the 
distribution of the endogenous variable DEVD and table 5 reports descriptive statistics of 
regressors. 
 
                                                           
15 Galicia is one of the Spanish regions where legislation compels municipalities to send actual budgets to 
regional government and regional audit office since 1985.   12
 





% OF MUNICIPALITIES 
1 3  1.0% 
3 5  1.6% 
5 3  1.0% 
6 6  1.9% 
7 10  3.2% 
8 20  6.4% 
9 41  13.1% 
10 104  33.2% 
11 121  38.7% 
 313  100.0% 
 
 
Table 3: Definition of variables and data sources 
NAME DEFINITION  DATA  SOURCE 
EA  Actual non-financial expenditures  Xunta de Galicia 
(www.xunta.es) 
EF  Forecasted non-financial expenditures  Xunta de Galicia 
RA  Actual non-financial revenues  Xunta de Galicia 
RF  Forecasted non-financial revenues  Xunta de Galicia 
DA=EA- RA  Actual deficit  Xunta de Galicia 



























Xunta de Galicia 
MA  It values 1 in the case of one-party majority 
incumbents and 0 otherwise 
Ministerio del Interior 
(www.elecciones.mir.es) 
P  Population expressed in thousands of inhabitants  INE (www.ine.es) 
 
CY  It values 1 in electoral years (1987, 1991, and 
1995) and 0 otherwise* 
--- 
LEFT  It values 1 for left wing cabinets and 0 otherwise  Ministerio del Interior 
ST  N-N* where N is the number of seats of the main 
incumbent party and N* is the threshold for 
absolute majority 
Ministerio del Interior 
*According to the Spanish electoral law, local elections are held on the last Sunday of May. Budget year 
starts on 1 January. Incumbents must present forecasted budgets to the council before 15 October.   13
Table 4: Distribution of DEVD 
DEVIATION IN DEFICIT  NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS  % 
DEVD <-50%  24  0.8% 
-50% < DEVD ≤ -25%  147  4.8% 
-25% < DEVD ≤ -10%  536  17.6% 
-10% < DEVD ≤ -5%  418  13.8% 
-5% < DEVD < 0%  582  19.2% 
DEVD = 0%  5  0.2% 
0% < DEVD ≤ 5%  545  17.9% 
5% < DEVD ≤ 10%  310  10.2% 
10% < DEVD ≤ 25%  341  11.2% 
25% < DEVD ≤ 50%  96  3.2% 
DEVD > 50%  35  1.2% 
TOTAL OBSERVATIONS  3039  100.0% 
TOTAL DEVD < 0%  1707  56.2% 
TOTAL DEVD > 0%  1327  43.7% 





Table 5: Descriptive statistics of regressors 
REGRESSOR MEAN  STANDARD  DEVIATION 
MA 0.68  DUMMY  (0/1) 
CY 0.26  DUMMY  (0/1) 
LEFT 0.23  DUMMY  (0/1) 
MA*ST 1.1  1.4 
(1-MA)*ST -0.7  1.4 
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IV. ECONOMETRIC ESTIMATES 
 
The basic econometric specification is the following: 
01 2 3 it i it t it it DEVD MA CY LEFT β ββ β ε =+ ⋅ + ⋅+ ⋅ +       [ 1 ]  
Total effects of explicative variables on DEVD may be twofold decomposed, by using as 
endogenous variable actual and forecasted deficits or, alternately, deviations in 
expenditures and revenues. All of them are weighted by initial expenditures and expressed 
in percentage: 
() ()
100 100 100 100
AF A F A F
FF F F
DD E E R R
DEVD DEVE DEVR
EE E E
⎛⎞ ⎛⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ −−
=⋅−⋅= ⋅− ⋅= − ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟
⎝⎠ ⎝⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
  
Estimates of [1] are reported in table 6. A Wald test on the need of individual effects 
was carried on. The hypothesis of homogeneity of intercepts should be clearly rejected (p-
value=0.000). Moreover, the Hausman test for random versus fixed effects showed that the 
latter were a better choice (p-value=0.009).  
 
Multicollinearity and serial autocorrelation are not problematic. Multiple 
correlations among regressors are relatively low. Assuming a common AR(1) process with 


















= -0.11. The hypothesis of common autocorrelation 
coefficients was verified by using an appropriated Wald test. Clearly, stationarity of 
residuals may not be rejected. 
  
On the contrary, the White test and the Brown-Forsythe test of equal variances in 
each subgroup of OLS residuals detected general heterocedasticity and cross-section 
heterocedasticity, respectively (p-value=0.00 in both cases). Moreover, the carrying out of a   15
LM test revealed the presence of contemporaneous correlations
16, which were not removed 
by including time fixed effects into regressions. 
 
The variance estimator proposed by White (1980) is robust to heteroscedasticity 
within each cross-section, but does not account for contemporaneous cross-section 
correlations. And there are a number of pitfalls associated with the application of SUR 
weighted least squares (sometimes referred to as the Parks estimator) with a small number 
of time periods as in this case (Beck et al, 1993; Beck and Katz, 1995; Beck, 2001). For 
that reason, these authors propose to retain OLS parameter estimates, replacing the OLS 
standard errors with panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE). The new covariance matrix is 






ii i ji j ii
ii j i




= ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟
⎝⎠ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠ ∑∑ ∑ ∑       [ 2 ]  
Tables 6 and 7 report p-values corresponding to robust t-statistics. 
 
  With the aim of checking the robustness of results, several possibilities have been 
explored. Firstly, different subsamples were used. In rows 1, 2, and 4 to 9 of table 7 
estimates of table 6 are replicated excluding observations from municipalities with more of 
50% of missing values
17, and deviations in deficit over 50% in absolute value. The aim of 
this change is to test the sensibility of results to extreme values. The sample size is reduced 
by 3%. Moreover, using a much more stringent criteria, in row 3 observations from 
municipalities with more than 50% of missing values and deviations in deficit over 10% in 
absolute value are excluded in row 3, involving a cut of 40% in the sample size. Secondly, 
time fixed effects are included in row 2 of tables 6 and 7
18. To avoid perfect 
multicollinearity, four dummies were dropped (D1985, and those corresponding to electoral 
years: D1987, D1991, and D1995). 
 











= ∑∑  where 
2
ij r are squared correlations among FGLS residuals See Greene (1997). Because 
the panel is unbalanced, the number of individual observations (T) is proxied by the average. Serial 
correlation holds when using a balanced panel of municipalities with full information. 
17 Estimating covariances σij was especially problematic in those cases.   16
  Results shown in rows 1 to 5 in table 6 and 7 may be synthesized as follows: 
 
1.  Deviations in deficit are lower in the case of one-party majority governments (MA). 
This result is supported by all estimates. On the contrary, distances with respect to 
majority thresholds are not statistically significant. In the row 3 of table 6 variable MA 
is dropped and interactions MA*ST and (1-MA)*ST are simultaneously included. While 
the former is not significant, the coefficient of the latter is negative and marginally 
significant (p-value=0.17). Taking into account that (1- ) * 0 MA ST ≤ , it would mean 
that the lower the political support enjoyed by no single-party majority incumbents the 
higher the probability of deviation in deficit. In order to avoid multicollinearity between 
both interactive terms
19, in rows 4 and 5 of table 6 they are incorporated alternately. 
Results hold. However, this conclusion is challenged by results shown in row 5 of table 
7. Once extreme values are withdrawn, p-value rise dramatically (p-value=0.50). 
 
2.  Deviations in deficit are higher in electoral years. While CY i s  o n l y  m a r g i n a l l y  
significant in rows 1 to five of table 6, it is significant at usual levels when extreme 
values are set aside (rows 1 to 5 of table 7). Being 1985 the reference year, all 
significant time dummies –except D1988 in table 6– have negative coefficients. 
 
3.  Ideology (LEFT) is not relevant to explain deviations in deficit. Corresponding p-values 
are very high in both tables. 
 
4.  Population has been excluded from estimates because it varies very little over time and 
it is then highly correlated with individual fixed effects. Hence its influence on the 
explained variable was estimated very imprecisely. In order to cast any light about this 
relationship, in row 1 of table 6 individual fixed effects were replaced by variable P. Its 
coefficient was negative and significant at 5% level
20. Moreover, estimated fixed effects 
were regressed on population averages over time. Again, the corresponding coefficient 
was negative, although only marginally significant. On the other hand, population size 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
18 For this puropose a set of dummy variables are defined: D19XX values 1 in 19XX and 0 otherwise. 
19 Regressing one interactive term on the other yields a R
2 over 0.60. 
20 10% in the case of row 1 in table 7.   17
was negatively correlated to the size of OLS residuals from row 1 of table 6 expressed 
in absolute values, which would explain the existence of cross-section heterocedasticity. 
 
Estimates shown in rows 6 to 9 in tables 6 and 7 try to cast additional light on the 
mechanisms explaining deviations. Endogenous variable is replaced by actual and 
forecasted deficit (rows 6 and 7), and deviations in expenditures and revenues (rows 8 and 
9). Results show that: 
 
1.  Lower deviations in deficit in the case of single-party majority governments are 
explained by the combination of higher forecasted deficits and lower actual deficits. On 
the other hand, upward deviations in forecasted revenues are higher in the case of 
single-party majority governments, which might be interpreted as signal of more 
prudence in revenue forecasts. 
 
2.  Electoral cycle does not affect forecasted deficit or deviations in expenditures. On the 
contrary, it rises actual deficits and boosts downward deviations in revenues.  
 
3.  Ideology does not seem to be related to the size of both forecasted and actual deficit. 
However, left wing incumbents are more prone to upward deviations in both 
expenditures and revenues. It might be interpreted as a more active role of left wing 
incumbents in the budget implementation phase. 
 
In sum, upward deviations in deficits are higher in the case of single-party majority 
governments, electoral years, and smaller municipalities. Moreover, variability of 
deviations –negative and positive- is negatively correlated to population size. On the 
contrary, the effect of ideology on deviations in deficit is scarcely relevant according to our 
estimates. And passing the threshold of absolute majority in the case of one single party 
seems much more relevant than the fragmentation of ruling coalitions or the strength of 
majorities.   18
Table 6: Econometric estimates of equation [1] 
Explained 
variable 































































    
 
 




    
D1986   -1.61 
[0.017] 
       
D1988   2.29 
[0.006] 
       
D1989   0.82 
[0.27] 
       
D1990   -5.61 
[0.000] 
       
D1992   -11.30 
[0.000] 
       
D1993   -0.51 
[0.49] 
       
D1994   -0.62 
[0.44] 
       
R
2  0.166 0.198 0.142 0.141 0.142 0.131 0.219 0.358 0.361 
Sample  Size  3039 3039 3039 3039 3039 3039 3039 3039 3039 
Notes: Individual fixed effects are included in all cases. Equations are estimated by OLS. 
Below coefficients appear p-values corresponding to robust t-statistics calculated using 
equation [2]. R
2 is the coefficient of determination.  
 
 
   19
 Table 7: Econometic estimates of equation [1]. Limited samples 
Explained 
variable 





























































MA*ST      0.10 
[0.72] 
     
(1-MA)*ST       -0.17 
[0.50] 
    
D1986   -0.97 
[0.11] 
       
D1988   0.14 
[0.81] 
       
D1989   -1.39 
[0.023] 
       
D1990   -7.18 
[0.000] 
       
D1992   -9.87 
[0.000] 
       
D1993   -0.23 
[0.66] 
       
D1994   0.55 
[0.32] 
       
R
2  0.137 0.189 0.196 0.136 0.136 0.139 0.238 0.358 0.387 
Sample 
Size 
2947 2947 1841 2947 2947 2947 2947 2947 2947 
Notes: Individual fixed effects are included in all cases. Equations are estimated by OLS. 
Below coefficients appear p-values corresponding to robust t-statistics calculated using 
equation [2]. R
2 is the coefficient of determination. Estimates exclude observations from 
municipalities with more of 50% of missing values and deviations in deficit over 50% in 
absolute value. 
*Excluding observations from municipalities with more than 50% of missing values and 
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V. CONCLUSIONS 
 
  Flexibility in execution of public budgets is a necessary condition for deviations in 
forecasted deficits. But it is not a sufficient explanation. In fact, significant differences 
between governments subject to the same budget procedures may be observed. The main 
conclusion of this paper is that politics matter when explaining those differences. In 
particular, we have shown the relevance of the incumbent’s political strength and the 
electoral cycle.  
 
Upward deviations in forecasted deficits are higher in the case of single-party 
majority governments, electoral years, and smaller municipalities. Moreover, variability of 
deviations –both negative and positive- is negatively correlated to population size. This 
result might be explained by technical capacity of officials assuming that it rises with 
jurisdiction size. 
 
On the other hand, the effect of ideology on deviations in deficit is scarcely relevant 
according to our estimates. And passing the threshold of absolute majority in the case of 
one single party seems much more relevant than the fragmentation of ruling coalitions or 
the strength of majorities. 
 
  Therefore, the positive relationship between flexibility in budget procedures and 
actual budgets found in empirical papers on the determinants of public deficits also depends 
on political factors. As it has been suggested in those works, restraining flexibility in 
execution of budget would then be a way to reduce systematic upward deviations. But it 
may be not enough, due to the imagination shown by many governments finding out 
gimmicks to escape from controls on budget modifications. While there is empirical 
evidence supporting that direct democracy reduces observed actual deficits, our paper 
shows that reinforcing ex post control on budgets may be another way towards fiscal 
consolidation.  
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